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                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    --------
                                   No. 91-1538
                                    --------

                        SANDRA JEAN SMITH, PETITIONER v.                                                     ___
                                  UNITED STATES

                       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
                      STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
                                     CIRCUIT

                                 [March 8, 1993]

  CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

  This case presents the question whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U. S. C. SS1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1988 ed. and Supp. II), applies
to tortious acts or omissions occurring in Antarctica, a sovereignless region
without civil tort law of its own. (Ftnote. 1)                                    (Ftnote. 1)













                    ____________________

   1)  Without indigenous human population and containing roughly one-tenth of   1)
the world's land mass, Antarctica is best described as "an entire continent of
disputed territory."  F. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics 1 (1982).  Seven
nations - Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the
United Kingdom - presently assert formal claims to pie-shaped portions of the
continent that total about 85 percent of its expanse.  Boczek, The Soviet Union
and the Antarctic Regime, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 834, 840 (1984); Hayton, The
Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 349 (1960).  The United States
does not recognize other nations' claims and does not itself assert a sovereign
interest in Antarctica, although it maintains a basis for such a claim.
Lissitzyn, The American Position on Outer Space and Antarctica, 53 Am. J. Int'l
L. 126, 128 (1959).  In any event, these sovereign claims have all been
suspended by the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, concluded in 1959.  Antarctic
Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959 [1961] 12 U. S. T. 794, T. I. A. S. No. 4780.  Article 4 of
the Treaty states that no claim may be enforced, expanded, or compromised while
the Treaty is in force, id., art. IV, 12 U. S. T., at 796, thus essentially                        ___
freezing nations' sovereign claims as of the date of the Treaty's execution.                                91-1538 - OPINION

2                            SMITH v. UNITED STATES                                  ____

We hold that it does not.
  Petitioner Sandra Jean Smith is the widow of John Emmett Smith and the duly
appointed representative of his estate.  At the time of his death, Smith worked
as a carpenter at McMurdo Station on Ross Island, Antarctica, for a construction
company under contract to the National Science Foundation, an agency of the
United States.  Smith and two companions one day took a recreational hike to
Castle Rock, located several miles outside of McMurdo Station.  On their return,
they departed from the marked route to walk across a snow field in the direction
of Scott Base, a New Zealand outpost not far from McMurdo Station.  After
stopping for a snack, one of the three men took a step and suddenly dropped from
sight.  Smith followed, and he, too, disappeared.  Both men had fallen into a
crevasse.  Despite search and rescue efforts, Smith died from exposure and
internal injuries suffered as a result of the fall.
  Petitioner filed this wrongful death action against the United States under
the FTCA in the District Court for the District of Oregon, the district where
she resides.  Petitioner alleged that the United States was negligent in failing
to provide adequate warning of the dangers posed by crevasses in areas beyond
the marked paths.  It is undisputed that petitioner's claim is based exclusively
on acts or omissions occurring in Antarctica.  Upon the motion of the United
States, the District Court dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, 702 F. Supp. 1480 (1989), holding that her claim was barred
by 28 U. S. C. S2680(k), the foreign-country exception.  Section 2680(k)
precludes the exercise of jurisdiction over "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign
country."
  The Court of Appeals affirmed, 953 F. 2d 1116 (CA9 1991).  It noted that the
term "foreign country" admits of multiple interpretations, and thus looked to
the language and structure of the FTCA as a whole to determine whether
Antarctica is a "foreign country" within the                                91-1538 - OPINION

                             SMITH v. UNITED STATES                            3                                  ____

meaning of the statute.  Adopting the analysis and conclusion of then-Judge
Scalia, see Beattie v. United States, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 70, 85-109, 756 F. 2d            _______    _____________
91, 106-130 (1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the Court of Appeals ruled that the
FTCA does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica.  To hold otherwise, the
Court of Appeals stated, would render two other provisions of the FTCA, 28
U. S. C. SS1402(b), 1346(b), nonsensical.  The Court of Appeals held, in the
alternative, that petitioner's suit would be barred even if Antarctica were not
a "foreign country" for purposes of the FTCA.  Because the FTCA was a limited
relinquishment of the common-law immunity of the United States, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the absence of any clear congressional intent to subject
the United States to liability for claims arising in Antarctica precluded
petitioner's suit.  We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between two
Courts of Appeals, (Ftnote. 2) 504 U. S.  -  -  (1992), and now affirm.                   (Ftnote. 2)
  Petitioner argues that the scope of the foreign-country exception turns on
whether the United States has recognized the legitimacy of another nation's
sovereign claim over the foreign land.  Otherwise, she contends, the land is not
a "country" for purposes of the FTCA.  Petitioner points out that the United
States does not recognize the validity of other nations' claims to portions of
Antarctica.  She asserts, moreover, that this construction of the term "foreign
country" is most consistent with the purpose underlying the foreign-country
exception.  According to petitioner, Congress enacted the foreign-country
exception in order to insulate the United States from tort liability imposed
pursuant to foreign law.  Because Antarctica has no law of its own, petitioner
claims that conventional choice-of-law rules control and require the application
of


























                    ____________________

   2)  Compare Beattie v. United States, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 70, 756 F. 2d 91   2)          _______    _____________
(1984) (holding that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" within the meaning of
the FTCA).                                91-1538 - OPINION

4                            SMITH v. UNITED STATES                                  ____

Oregon law, the law of her domicile.  Thus, petitioner concludes, the rationale
for the foreign-country exception would not be compromised by the exercise of
jurisdiction here, since the United States would not be subject to liability
under the law of a foreign nation.
  Petitioner's argument for governmental liability here faces significant
obstacles in addition to the foreign-country exception, but we turn first to the
language of that proviso.  It states that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply to "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country."  28
U. S. C. S2680(k).  Though the FTCA offers no definition of "country," the
commonsense meaning of the term undermines petitioner's attempt to equate it
with "sovereign state."  The first dictionary definition of "country" is simply
"[a] region or tract of land."  Webster's New International Dictionary 609 (2d
ed. 1945).  To be sure, this is not the only possible interpretation of the
term, and it is therefore appropriate to examine other parts of the statute
before making a final determination.  But the ordinary meaning of the language
itself, we think, includes Antarctica, even though it has no recognized
government.
  Our construction of the term "foreign country" draws support from the language
of S1346(b), "[t]he principal provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act."
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 6 (1962).  That section waives the________    _____________
sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal
employees "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where                                _____________________________________________
the act or omission occurred."  28 U. S. C. S1346(b) (emphasis added).  We have____________________________
construed S1346(b) in determining what law should apply in actions brought under
the FTCA.  See Richards, supra.  But by its terms the section is more than a               ________  _____
choice-of-law provision: it delineates the scope of the United States' waiver of
sovereign immunity.  If Antarctica were not a "foreign                                91-1538 - OPINION

                             SMITH v. UNITED STATES                            5                                  ____

country," and for that reason included within the FTCA's coverage, S1346(b)
would instruct courts to look to the law of a place that has no law in order to
determine the liability of the United States - surely a bizarre
result. (Ftnote. 3)  Of course, if it were quite clear from the balance of the        (Ftnote. 3)
statute that governmental liability was intended for torts committed in
Antarctica, then the failure of S1346(b) to specify any governing law might be
treated as a statutory gap that the courts could fill by decisional law.  But
coupled with what seems to us the most natural interpretation of the foreign-
country exception, this portion of S1346(b) reinforces the conclusion that
Antarctica is excluded from the coverage of the FTCA.
  Section 1346(b) is not, however, the only FTCA provision that contradicts
petitioner's interpretation of the foreign-country exception.  The statute's
venue provision, S1402(b), provides that claims under the FTCA may be brought
"only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or
omission complained of occurred."  Because no federal judicial district
encompasses Antarctica, petitioner's interpretation of the FTCA would lead to
yet another anomalous result:  the FTCA would establish jurisdiction for all
tort claims against the United States arising in Antarctica, but no venue would
exist unless the claimant happened to reside in the United
States. (Ftnote. 4)  As we observed in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd.        (Ftnote. 4)                    ____________________________










                    ____________________

   3)  Nor can the law of the plaintiff's domicile, Oregon here, be substituted   3)
in FTCA actions based on torts committed in Antarctica.  "Congress has expressly
stated that the Government's liability is to be determined by the application of
a particular law, the law of the place where the act or omission occurred
. . . ."  Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962).  Petitioner does not          ________    _____________
contend that her cause of action is based on acts or omissions occurring in
Oregon.
   4)  The history of the FTCA reveals that Congress declined to enact earlier   4)
versions of the statute that would have differentiated between foreign and
United States residents.  Those versions would have barred claims "arising in a
foreign country in behalf of an alien."  S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,                ______________________
S303(12) (1939) (emphasis added); H. R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., S 303(12)
(1939) (emphasis added).  At the suggestion of the Attorney General, the last
five words of the proposed bills were dropped.  See Hearings on H. R. 5373 and
H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
29, 35, 66 (1942).  As we observed in United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217,                                      _____________    ______
220 (1949), "[t]he superseded draft had made the waiver of the Government's
traditional immunity turn upon the fortuitous circumstance of the injured
party's citizenship."  The amended version, however, "identified the coverage of
the Act with the scope of United States sovereignty."  Id., at 220-221.  At                                                       ___
least insofar as Antarctica is concerned, petitioner's interpretation of the
FTCA would effectively resurrect the scheme rejected by Congress; it would deny
relief to foreign residents in circumstances where United States residents could
recover.                                91-1538 - OPINION

6                            SMITH v. UNITED STATES                                  ____

v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706, 710, n. 8 (1972), "Congress does not   _______________________
in general intend to create venue gaps, which take away with one hand what Con-
gress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other."  Thus, in
construing the FTCA, it is "reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids
leaving such a gap," ibid., especially when that construction comports with the                     _____
usual meaning of a disputed term.
  Our decisions interpreting the FTCA contain varying statements as to how it
should be construed.  See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S.                           ____                              _  _____________    ______________
543, 547 (1951); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953); United                 ________    _____________                           ______
States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807, 813 (1976); Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S.______    _______                             _____    _____________
848, 853, n. 9 (1984).  See also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,  -  -                                  _____________    ____________________
U. S.  -  - ,  -  -  (1992).  A recent statement of this sort, and the one to
which we now adhere, is found in United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111,                                 _____________    _______
117-118 (1979):  "We should also have in mind that the Act waives the immunity
of the United States and that . . . we should not take it upon ourselves to
extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.  [Citations omitted.]
Neither, however, should we assume the authority to narrow the waiver that                                91-1538 - OPINION

                             SMITH v. UNITED STATES                            7                                  ____

Congress intended."  Reading the foreign-country exception to the FTCA to
exclude torts committed in Antarctica accords with this canon of construction.
  Lastly, the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States
statutes requires that any lingering doubt regarding the reach of the FTCA be
resolved against its encompassing torts committed in Antarctica.  "It is a
longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.'"  EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499                                      ____    ________________________
U. S.  -  - ,  -  -  (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S.                                     _________________    _______
281, 285 (1949)).  In applying this principle, "[w]e assume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality."
Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at  -  - ; accord, e.g., Argentine Republic v.________________________  _____                     ____                                                       _  __________________
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 440 (1989) ("When it desires to do___________________________
so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of
a statute").  The applicability of the presumption is not defeated here just
because the FTCA specifically addresses the issue of extraterritorial applica-
tion in the foreign-country exception.  To the contrary, as we stated in United                                                                         ______
States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 222 (1949), "[t]hat presumption, far from being______    ______
overcome here, is doubly fortified by the language of this statute and the
legislative purpose underlying it."  Petitioner does not assert, nor could she,
that there is clear evidence of congressional intent to apply the FTCA to claims
arising in Antarctica. (Ftnote. 5)                       (Ftnote. 5)

























                    ____________________

   5)  Petitioner instead argues that the presumption against extraterritori-   5)
ality applies only if it serves to avoid "`unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.'"
Brief for Petitioner 16 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S.  -                                  ____    ________________________
- ,  -  -  (1991)).  But the presumption is rooted in a number of consider-
ations, not the least of which is the common-sense notion that Congress
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.                                91-1538 - OPINION

8                            SMITH v. UNITED STATES                                  ____

  For all of these reasons, we hold that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity
does not apply to tort claims arising in Antarctica.  Some of these reasons are
based on the language and structure of the statute itself; others are based on
presumptions as to extraterritorial application of Acts of Congress and as to
waivers of sovereign immunity.  We think these norms of statutory construction
have quite likely led us to the same conclusion that the 79th Congress would
have reached had it expressly considered the question we now decide:  it would
not have included a desolate and extraordinarily dangerous land such as
Antarctica within the scope of the FTCA.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is therefore

Affirmed.________